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Integrating the streams of morality research: The case of political ideology What is morality? Are we born with it, or do we acquire it? Why are moral judgments so deeply held, and yet so inconsistent across individuals and societies? Do these judgments predict (im)moral behavior? These questions have been asked for millennia, but empirical answers have only recently begun to emerge thanks to a flourishing interdisciplinary science of human morality (Haidt, 2007) . Even as the content focus has shifted (e.g., moral development, moral cognition, moral emotion), morality research has generally proceeded along two distinct streams reflecting Cronbach's (1957) "correlational/experimental" distinction: 1. Individual/cultural differences in moral values, judgments, and attitudes, and 2. situational determinants of individual moral decisions and behaviors.
This division characterizes several subfields within psychology (Tracy, Robins, & Sherman, 2009 ), but it is particularly stark and limiting in the case of moral psychology. What's special about morality? Much of the academic and popular interest in morality comes from the conflict between feeling moral convictions as objective certainty on one hand (Skitka, 2010 ), yet seeing widespread cultural and political variation in those convictions on the other. Part of the research-stream division unique to morality consists in the situational determinants line treating morality as if it were a completely agreed-upon construct, rather than taking into account the wide variation in how people construe the moral domain. At the same time, the moral beliefs and values studied in the individual differences stream are fundamentally concerned with behavior, which has primarily been studied in the situational determinants stream.
In this paper we briefly characterize the current state of both streams, highlighting the lack in each. We then review recent work on political ideology as a point at which these research streams are beginning to converge. Finally, we outline the benefits such an integration can have Integrating the Streams of Morality Research 4 for understanding the links between situational constraints, moral judgments, and moral behavior.
Individual Differences in Morality
Individuals and cultures often disagree about how moral decisions should be made, what types of considerations are morally relevant, and what "morality" even means. Although not specific to morality, there is much variation in how people prioritize their values, from hedonism and achievement to benevolence and tradition (see Feldman, 2003 and Schwartz, 1992 for reviews). Building on this and the anthropological work of Richard Shweder, Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007) posits intuitive concerns about care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, respect/subversion, and sanctity/degradation. Stable individual differences in these concerns have been found in investigations of culture (Easterners morally care about loyalty and respect more than Westerners), political ideology (liberals care more about carefairness and less about loyalty-respect-sanctity than conservatives), and gender (women care more about care, fairness, and sanctity than men; Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2011) . Given such variation in what terrain "morality" covers, investigations of moral behavior have an added layer of complexity to account for in determining the moral status of a given behavior for the individuals being observed.
Individuals also vary in moral identity -that is, how much morally-relevant concerns define one's self-concept. People with stronger moral identity have been shown to act more morally (e.g., giving more money to charity), in part because they are more immune to rationalizations justifying immoral behavior (see Aquino & Freeman, 2009, for review) .
Scientists have learned much about moral decision-making using philosophical puzzles like the famous trolley dilemma, which pit an action's consequences (e.g., kill one person to save five Integrating the Streams of Morality Research 5 others) against moral rules (e.g., never use a person as a means to an end). Although responses to these dilemmas have been offered as evidence of a "universal" moral grammar (Mikhail, 2007) , individual differences have been found in these decision-making propensities; for example, men and liberals are more consequentialist on average than women and conservatives (Fumagalli et al., 2010; Graham, Sherman, et al., 2011) .
Unfortunately, this research stream has largely failed to empirically consider the relationships between individual differences and moral behaviors (be they observed discrete actions in the lab or self/peer-assessments of real-world behaviors; see discussion of two notable exceptions below). We do not know, for instance, whether differences in decision-making about hypothetical dilemmas predict behavioral outcomes in the real world, nor whether people who make harsher judgments about sanctity/degradation act in any more "sanctified" ways than anyone else.
Situational Effects on Morality
A recent explosion of experimental research has revealed subtle situational effects on the severity of moral judgments. Disgust cues such as fart smells and tissue-laden desks can increase the severity of moral judgments (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008) , even when disgust is primed under hypnotic suggestion (Wheatley & Haidt, 2005) . In contrast, positive mood inductions can decrease the severity of moral judgments, making people more likely to deem a harmful action morally appropriate (Valdesolo & Desteno, 2006) . Physical cleansing can also diminish moral judgments, via the embodied metaphor linking physical and moral purity (Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008) .
While relatively little is known about the relationship between moral behavior and morally-relevant individual differences, the effects of situational variables on moral behavior are Integrating the Streams of Morality Research 6 better understood. In fact, one of the classics of the situationist perspective was an attack on the idea that individual differences in moral behavior are consistent across situational contexts (Hartshorne & May, 1928) . Although there is now evidence of more behavioral consistency than earlier suggested (e.g., Fleeson & Noftle, 2008) , recent work in social psychology, experimental philosophy, and behavioral economics has provided an extensive list of situational effects on moral behavior, from the peripheral (low levels of light in a room reduce honesty; Zhong, Bohns, & Gino, 2010) to the emotional (feelings of elevation increase helping behavior; Schnall, Roper, & Fessler, 2010) To date, however, our understanding of situational effects on moral behavior is limited to a constrained set of discrete behaviors performed in artificial settings that may not generalize to real-world behavior (Levitt & List, 2007) . Despite claims for the universality of some of these effects, most of them have been demonstrated solely with Western student samples, and so it remains unknown whether situational effects are robust across cultural and individual variation (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) . This knowledge gap is particularly problematic in the moral domain because much of moral thought and behavior consists precisely in disagreements between people about what is right, what is wrong, and what even "counts" as a moral issue. By limiting the study of morality to discrete decisions and actions made by college students in the lab, the situational effects stream has left out much of moral life, from shared moral narratives to religious rituals to everyday moral gossip.
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Political Ideology: A Recent Confluence Fortunately, the two streams of morality research summarized above have begun to converge. Here we describe one point of convergence: research linking morality and political ideology.
Along with morality, ideology has also undergone a resurgence of interest in the last decade, and has emerged as an important moderator for a host of individual differences and situational effects (see Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009, for review) . It is a powerful unique predictor of both the kinds of moral concerns people have (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009) and the processes by which people make moral decisions (Graham, Sherman, et al., 2011) . Ideology has been shown to predict individual differences in emotional responses, with conservatives more sensitive to physical disgust than liberals (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009 ); concurrently, manipulations of disgust can increase the severity of moral judgments . This has led to the finding that conservatives' moral judgments are more impacted by physical disgust than are the moral judgments of liberals (Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz, 2011) .
In their convergence, these two research streams went beyond the main effects of disgust manipulations and political ideology to reveal a theoretically-relevant person/situation interaction. However, Cronbach's (1957) distinction covered not only person/situation focus, but a wide range of differences, including research designs, assessment measures/methods, data analytic strategies, and validity emphases (external vs. internal). Considering these factors makes it clear that a complete convergence is still yet to come in moral psychology. For instance, although several studies have examined individual-difference moderators of experimental effects on moral judgment (e.g., Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008) , evidence is lacking as to how individual differences and situations interact to affect moral behavior. Similarly, real-world moral behaviors Integrating the Streams of Morality Research 8 can be predicted by individual differences in moral judgments -values predict voting behavior (Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, & Vecchione, 2006) and moral identity centrality predicts charitable giving (Aquino & Freeman, 2009 However, unearthing moral person-situation interactions is just one of the potential benefits of a more complete convergence of the research streams. In the next section we describe what else an integrated moral psychology could do -namely, delineate the relationships between moral judgment and moral behavior, and expand the range of moral behaviors studied.
Future Directions
A great deal is known about moral values, and a great deal is known about what influences discrete behaviors in lab situations, but very little is known about how moral thought and moral behavior relate, interact, or come into conflict in the real world. Thus an integrated Integrating the Streams of Morality Research 9 approach may be most useful for meeting two major challenges: 1. predicting when (and for whom) moral judgments will relate to behavior; and 2. predicting a more complete set of morally-relevant behaviors.
Predicting gaps between moral judgment and behavior.
Moral hypocrisy -usually operationalized as engaging in behaviors that one judges to be morally wrong -has been a primary topic of interest since the beginnings of psychology (Blasi, 1980) . But research on situational determinants has tended to use moral judgment and moral behavior only as dependent variables, neglecting the relations between the two, and research on individual differences usually disregards behavior altogether. The simultaneous consideration of situational effects and individual differences can illuminate moral hypocrisy by mapping out variations -across people, cultures, and situations -in the gaps between moral judgments and behaviors. differentiates morality from other psychological phenomena. For example, if an investigator wishes to measure a subject's "behavior toward a female experimenter," the gender of the experimenter is a matter of objective fact, and so the definition of the behavioral context need not be questioned. When it comes to a subject's "moral behavior," however, no such objective criteria exist by which it can be assumed that every individual will experience a particular behavior as equally morally relevant. Knowing whether someone's behaviors conflict with their moral judgments thus cannot rely on universalist assumptions about those judgments. This is why integrating Cronbach's streams is of particular importance (and particular difficulty) in the case of morality. For a complete picture of when and where people's behavior conflicts with their moral principles and judgments, individual, cultural, and situational effects on judgments and behaviors will need to be examined in a more integrated way.
Predicting a more comprehensive array of morally-relevant behaviors.
In part because of the aforementioned need to hold moral judgment constant, the situational determinants stream has studied a narrow range of (im)moral behaviors, usually limited to discrete instances of lying or cheating in a laboratory context. Research on individual differences, in contrast, has included judgments about a much wider set of behaviors, but rarely measures those behaviors themselves.
The central insight from the latter research stream is that much of moral life consists precisely in arguments about the moral status of behaviors, whether they should be judged as good, bad, or morally irrelevant. For instance, is telling a joke based on outgroup stereotypes a morally relevant behavior? What about attending a protest rally, physically disciplining your child, flirting with a coworker, or attending religious services? What about omissions -that is, what is the moral status of not attending a protest rally, never physically disciplining your child, avoiding office flirtation, or skipping religious services? The moral status of these acts and Integrating the Streams of Morality Research 11 omissions is likely to depend on the moral judgments of the individuals involved, the moral norms of the culture, and the situational context in which these decisions are made. Fortunately, recent methodological advancements such as ecological momentary assessment and the electronically-activated recorder (see Mehl & Conner, 2012) are making it more feasible to observe behavior outside the lab, in naturally-occurring social contexts. Combining the strengths of the individual differences and situational determinants approaches can allow for measurement of a much wider range of behaviors considered moral or immoral by different people in different contexts.
Conclusion
Scientific understanding of moral thought and behavior is growing at a rapid rate. This progress stems from two streams of research in psychology and related fields, one on individual/cultural differences in moral concerns and one on situational determinants of moral judgments and behavior. These streams have begun to converge, as work on political ideology demonstrates. If they can be more fully integrated, their confluence will allow for a more complete picture of the links between moral judgment and moral behavior, and a more complete picture of moral life overall.
